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Conservation interventions are being implemented at various spatial scales to
reduce the impacts of rising global population and affluence on biodiversity
and ecosystems. While the direct impacts of these conservation efforts are con-
sidered, the unintended consequences brought about by market feedback ef-
fects are often overlooked. Perverse market outcomes could result in reduced
or even reversed net impacts of conservation efforts. We develop an economic
framework to describe how the intended impacts of conservation interven-
tions could be compromised due to unanticipated reactions to regulations in
the market: policies aimed at restricting supply could potentially result in leak-
age effects through external or unregulated markets. Using this framework,
we review how various intervention methods could result in negative feed-
back impacts on biodiversity, including legal restrictions like protected areas,
market-based approaches, and agricultural intensification. Finally, we discuss
how conservation management and planning can be designed to ensure the
risks of perverse market outcomes are detected, if not overcome, and we ad-
dress some knowledge gaps that affect our understanding of how market feed-
backs vary across spatial and temporal scales, especially with teleconnectedness
and increased international trade.
Introduction
With increasing global population and affluence, the
global demand for timber, food, and other natural re-
sources is rising, with crop demands projected to in-
crease by 100–110% from 2005 levels by 2050 (Tilman
et al. 2011). Meeting this demand will drive further for-
est degradation from logging and deforestation for agri-
culture and timber plantations, especially in the trop-
ics (Hansen et al. 2013). Habitat loss in the tropics is
the biggest driver of biodiversity and ecosystem function
losses (DeFries et al. 2004). There is thus an urgent need
to better manage tropical land-use change to reduce the
loss of biodiversity and ecosystem functions, while ad-
dressing the issue of rising timber and food demands, for
instance, via changing diets or reducing food waste (Erb
et al. 2016).
Management strategies are commonly implemented to
reduce conversion of natural habitats to other land uses,
and therefore to stem the loss of biodiversity. These in-
clude legal restrictions on land-use by establishing pro-
tected areas (PAs) (Oliveira et al. 2007), market-based
conservation efforts such as certification and payment for
ecosystem services (PES) schemes (Chobotová 2013), and
improvements in technology and agricultural intensifica-
tion (Tilman et al. 2011).
Often, however, there are indirect and unintended
consequences of conservation measures. Trade-offs are
inevitable with changes in land use (DeFries et al. 2004),
and this includes when implementing conservation ef-
forts. Many unintended consequences are often over-
looked when assessing the effectiveness of biodiversity
conservation actions (Larrosa et al. 2016), in part because
indirect environmental and ecological impacts of land-
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use changes and conservation actions typically occur over
longer time-scales and larger distances than directly mea-
sured outcomes. Unintended consequences can have pos-
itive or negative effects on the overall (net) outcomes
of interventions. Positive feedback effects include pro-
tection or restrictions on wildlife harvests diminishing
demand (Pain et al. 2006) and unintended crowding-in
effects from market-based conservation policies (Wun-
der 2013). By contrast, negative feedbacks could in-
clude demand driving leakage of deforestation into un-
protected areas in response to establishing PAs (Ewers
& Rodrigues 2008) and an increase in demand brought
about by improving cost-efficiency of agriculture (Rudel
et al. 2009).
Given that negative feedbacks compromise conserva-
tion efforts, we focus on their emergence via the influ-
ence of market forces. Knowledge of the socio-ecological
system responses is crucial for decision makers to min-
imize negative unintended feedbacks. Typologies that
classify feedbacks between deletion (removal of pre-
existing feedbacks), addition, and flows (changes in mag-
nitude of pre-existing feedbacks) have recently been de-
veloped (Larrosa et al. 2016). Under this typology, market
feedbacks could be considered flow feedbacks and PAs es-
tablishment addition feedbacks.
Market feedbacks in response to the initial conser-
vation intervention can undermine conservation efforts
(Armsworth et al. 2006), and although important, they
are often not considered in policies (Jantke & Schneider
2011; Miller et al. 2012; St John et al. 2013). Understand-
ing how agents in a market respond to policy changes is
very important in determining whether a certain scheme
will have the intended consequences, or instead be coun-
terproductive (Galaz et al. 2015). Changes in policy typi-
cally affect the incentives of agents, resulting in changes
in their behaviors. In many cases, the reaction of agents to
the new incentives resulting from policies in biodiversity
conservation will have a large influence over whether the
policy is successful, or if perverse incentives will lead to
damaging unintended consequences instead. Arguably,
unintended consequences of environmental and conser-
vation policies through these channels have not attracted
sufficient scrutiny to date (Milner-Gulland 2012). It is
therefore essential to understand how a policy will alter
the pattern of incentives of agents in the market. Indeed,
successful policies will be designed to ensure the incen-
tives of agents in the market are compatible with the in-
tended aims of the policy.
In this review, we focus on the potential perverse mar-
ket outcomes of conservation efforts. We first develop
a theoretical model to explain how market regulations
respond to conservation efforts. Reframing conservation
in an economic context allows us to understand how
market feedbacks could lead to perverse outcomes. We
then apply the framework to different conservation
interventions and discuss how conservation policies and
management practices might be adapted to minimize the
risk of negative consequences.
Economic underpinnings of unintended
consequences via market feedbacks
Conservation places restrictions on resource
use
Conservation interventions can be viewed as external im-
pacts on the resource market (e.g., timber), which can
result in a shift in the equilibrium or lead to disequilib-
rium. In many cases, conservation actions revolve around
restricting access to a resource. Placing logging bans and
quotas on timber harvests, for example, restricts trade of
the commodity (i.e., timber). Establishing PAs also re-
stricts land availability and access to resources. Impos-
ing such restrictions limits the quantity of supply (q1,
Figure 1A), and the market is no longer in equilibrium.
The market responds with a rise in the price to p1, above
the initial equilibrium level, at which suppliers would like
to offer more than q1 to the market (q1, Figure 1A). This
represents the basic economic model of a quota (Goolsbee
et al. 2016).
However, there is some question about the effective-
ness of such policies in practice. For instance, applica-
tions of this theory to include leakages (Murray et al.
2004; Jonsson et al. 2012) involve the expansion of sup-
ply back toward the quantity at the free-market equilib-
rium. Related arguments of how illegal trade can expand
consumption in the presence of import quotas have also
been established in the international trade literature (e.g.,
Falvey 1978). In other words, some of the restriction in
quantity due to the quota may be undone by illegal trade.
Perverse “illegal” (black) market incentives reduce the
impact of the conservation policy.
The imposition of a quota also produces an artificially
high price in the formal market, meaning that inefficient
(high-cost) suppliers can co-exist with efficient ones. This
presents the question—which suppliers supply the formal
market and which supply the black market? In address-
ing this question, we highlight a novel further possible
perverse impact of a quota policy. Compared to a free
market where efficiency considerations determine which
firms supply the formal market, the allocation of supply
rights under a quota policy is now determined by the
regulatory authority. With high prices within the formal
market, there is less incentive to be efficient, and inef-
ficient suppliers could end up supplying the market. If
the regulatory authority does not observe efficiency and
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Figure 1 Conceptual framework describing possible effects of an output quota (A) on the creation of an illegal market (B). (A) The market is initially in
equilibrium at (q0,p0). Setting a quota restricts the quantity of resource traded to q1 raising the price to p1. Firms can respond to this disequilibrium by
creating an illegal market. Assuming, for simplicity, there are no additional costs to illegal supply relative to regulated supply, firms will expand supply
through the illegal market moving up the supply curve beyond q1 with total supply rising toward the pre-quota level, q0. (B) If, for instance, the inefficient
firms (green) supply the formal market, supplying q1, and the efficient firms (red) supply the illegal market, supplying q2-q1, the creation of the illegal
market can result in an overall increase in the quantity traded (q2>q0) despite the quota. We might also expect shifts in demand and supply (shaded)
within the unregulated market due to externalities.
allocate supply rights to the most efficient firms, or, if
the authority is able to exploit the power of allocating
rights to pursue their own agenda (e.g., corruptly supply-
ing rights to “friendly”, possibly high-cost, firms), then
one perverse result of the imposition of a quota might
be a decline in market efficiency. In such a case, the
inefficient firms supply the formal market and the effi-
cient firms supply the unregulated market—there is a re-
organization of supply (Figure 1B) akin to the rationing
rules on the demands side used, for instance, in Davidson
& Deneckere (1986). The total output across the formal
and black markets in this case could be greater than under
the initial equilibrium before the quota was introduced
(q2, Figure 1B). The quota might be ineffective in terms
of reducing trade, and may even result in an increase in
trade.
The degree to which the quantity traded exceeds the
quota will depend on which firms supply each market,
as well as the costs and benefits to firms and consumers
from trading in the illegal market. For instance, supply
in the illegal market will shift downward, reducing the
leakage effect, if the costs associated with supplying the
legal market are lower than supplying the illegal mar-
ket. However, where the legal market has high costs as-
sociated with meeting regulatory standards, by avoiding
these costs, firms trading in the illegal sector might offset
extra costs associated with the illegal market (e.g., con-
cealment costs).
Improving land-use practices and efficiency
to reduce land-use
Conservation measures could also involve improving ef-
ficiency and technology through agricultural intensifi-
cation and new crop varieties, to reduce the pressure
to convert more land. While the direct impact of such
measures could be an increase in production with a re-
duced need for land, there may also be unintended con-
sequences. Although there is uncertainty as to whether
intensification would improve the cost-efficiency of pro-
duction, if improved, it could lead to a decrease in the
costs of resources: suppliers are willing to supply more
at any given price. This is associated with a rightward
shift in the supply curve and consequently, in the equilib-
rium (q0,p0 – q2,p2, Figure 2), resulting in an overall in-
crease in resources being traded (e.g., Villoria et al. 2014).
The size of this shift in equilibrium does depend on the
price elasticity demand of the product—with a more pro-
nounced effect in the case of an elastic demand (where
demand varies strongly with prices). Conservation mea-
sures aimed at regulating the supply of, for instance, agri-
cultural production might instead put additional pressure
on remaining available resources.
These perverse outcomes could be exacerbated in
markets where the global demand is supplied though
multiple substitutes, such as different types of vegetable
oil crops (e.g., oil palm, rapeseed). Assuming markets
for both commodities are the same (perfect substitutes),
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Figure 2 Conceptual framework describing how prices and quantities of
resources traded vary when crops are improved. Agricultural intensifica-
tion can shift supply rightward (black to orange) resulting in an overall shift
in equilibrium from (q0,p0) to (q2,p2).
initial equilibria for both commodities should also be
identical (q0p0, Figure 3A). Improving yields in one
crop lowers prices for any given quantity proportionally,
represented by a shift in supply curve from SupplyA to
SupplyAInt, and causes a shift in equilibrium from q0p0 to
qApA (Figure 3B). Additionally, we can expect decreased
demand for the less efficient substitute, denoted by the
downward shift in DemandB, and a decrease in quantity
of crop B (from q0 to qB): consumers are likely to favor
the cheaper crop beyond price pA. We can therefore
expect higher quantities of crop A traded, and a surplus
of crop B not traded. Overall, however, there could still
be a net increase in agricultural land use (deforestation
for crop A – forest recovery on abandoned land from
crop B), and a net loss of old-growth forests across a
larger region (Carrasco et al. 2014).
Examples of conservation measures
and market feedbacks
Legal restrictions on land use
Legal protection and restrictions on land use are widely
implemented globally and include establishing PAs and
regulating logging and other resource harvest quotas.
Such conservation measures rely on regulation by an
authority, usually governmental, to ensure the impacts
on ecosystems and biodiversity are minimal, or at least
compensated. However, legally enforced (i.e., sufficiently
funded) conservation policies are often only effective
within their designated areas, typically at local spatial
scales, and could lead to a displacement of destructive
activity and land use into unprotected and unregulated
areas (Ewers & Rodrigues 2008).
Establishing PAs could be effective in directly reducing
human impacts within targeted forests, but in many in-
stances might be driven more by markets than by conser-
vation or ecological considerations (Rayner et al. 2014).
Many PAs lack additionality because they are situated
in locations passively protected by their distance to mar-
kets, unproductive soils, steep gradients, etc. The estab-
lishment of PAs in economically valuable areas could in-
crease land prices across remaining areas (Polasky 2006),
and shift deforestation and land-use changes into unpro-
tected forests instead. This could create incentives for an
unregulated market with consequences as outlined in the
framework (Figure 1B).
In the tropics, such leakage effects result in high
rates of clearing and degradation of forested areas sur-
rounding PAs. For instance, while deforestation rates in
the Peruvian Amazon were as low as 2% within PAs,
they were up to 18 times higher outside PAs (Oliveira
et al. 2007). Similarly, protection of mature forests in
Costa Rica reduced the rate of mature forest loss by
50%, but resulted in cropland expansion redirected into
unprotected natural habitats, including wetlands, native
reforestation, and young secondary forests, due to the
lack of legal protection of these areas (Fagan et al. 2013).
Furthermore, import of timber and agricultural products
into the country increased, displacing land-use change
internationally (Jadin et al. 2016). Another potential
perverse outcome is an acceleration of land-grabs before
regulations are put in place. This situation was observed
in Tanzania where accelerated land conversion occurred
in anticipation of PA expansion (Baird et al. 2009).
Legal restrictions against resource extraction, much
like PAs, can also have displacement effects into unreg-
ulated areas, rather than decreased harvests as intended:
a similar restriction to a quota is placed on resource
quantity, which could result in an informal market
arising with a re-organization of supply and expansion of
total output (Figure 1B). Reduction in deforestation rates
across multiple countries was, for instance, associated
with displacement via international trade (Meyfroidt
et al. 2010).
Basic economic principles can be used to show how
endogenous market feedbacks (i.e., changes within the
market, Figure 1) could undermine conservation efforts
and benefits, and change conservation priorities (Murray
et al. 2004; Armsworth et al. 2006). More recently, stud-
ies have integrated sub-models of resource extraction and
biodiversity impacts, fluctuations in household utility and
market prices, and spatially explicit distributions of biodi-
versity and resources to highlight the impacts on land-use
change (Bode et al. 2015; Renwick et al. 2015).
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Figure 3 Conceptual framework describing the possible effects of agricultural intensification on demand and land-use of substitute crops (B). (A)
Assuming, for simplicity, that demand and supply conditions of each commodity are identical, both markets will have the same initial equilibrium (q0,p0).
(B) Agricultural intensification of one crop (A, orange) can increase amount traded, from q0 to qA. Additionally, demand for the substitute crop B could
decrease (green), as consumers are likely to favor the cheaper substitute above price pA. Amount of crop B traded decreases to qB, resulting in either a
surplus (shaded region) not traded. This surplus will ultimately lead to either innovation to use the surplus, or land abandonment from crop B. Improving
oil palm yields (pictured lower inset) in the tropics, for example, could lead to a decreased demand in rapeseed oil (upper inset), allowing secondary forest
regrowth in temperate regions, but the increased demand for palm oil could increase tropical deforestation.
Market-mediated conservation measures
Market-based approaches to conservation policies are
increasingly seen as efficient, effective means of manag-
ing resources, while promoting conservation (Chobotová
2013). The impacts of biodiversity are controlled through
use of markets, and practices that promote conservation
are incentivized over practices with negative environ-
mental outcomes. These could be used as complements
to legally mandated conservation measures (Lambin et al.
2014). Nevertheless, as highlighted in our framework,
these approaches still allow a quota to be set: a govern-
ing authority defines a formal, regulated market and
determines who supplies within this market, potentially
re-organizing supply with possible perverse consequences
(Figure 1B). Furthermore, market-based measures re-
volve around incentivizing suppliers of the formal
market, and do not necessarily penalize suppliers of the
informal market. Much like legally mandated measures,
market-based interventions could favor an unregulated
market (with uncertified resources at lower prices, q2p2,
Figure 1B) alongside the regulated market (with certified
resources at higher prices, q1p1, Figure 1B). These per-
verse outcomes can occur at both local and transnational
scales, because policies are typically narrowly focused
and do not account for their wider consequences.
PES schemes, such as the United Nations’ Reduc-
ing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degrada-
tion (REDD+), although not widely implemented, are in-
creasingly popular (Wunder 2013). They provide a means
of internalizing the externalities from loss of ecosystem
services and enhancing conservation efforts by compen-
sating suppliers who help improve or protect ecosystem
services via habitat protection or restoration.
PES schemes could promote more sustainable practices
within the market, and allow authorities to decide who
supplies the regulated market. However, this neither di-
rectly reduces the overall demand for a resource, nor does
it penalize suppliers to the informal market. The incentive
of supplying the informal market could therefore remain
high (Figure 1B), and the market might favor suppliers of
the informal market—we could ultimately witness a dis-
placement of land-degrading activity into areas not regu-
lated by the PES scheme. This leakage effect could be ex-
acerbated as prices within the regulated market increase
(p1, Figure 1B).
Perverse incentives could also occur within PES
schemes if they are not implemented and managed well
(Wunder 2013). When suppliers are only rewarded by fa-
vorable practices within designated areas (e.g., for addi-
tional management practices like afforestation), we could
observe a leakage of effect, where destructive activity dis-
placed into areas not enrolled in PES schemes but belong-
ing to the same owner are neglected (Atmadja & Verchot
2012). Managing PES schemes also becomes increasingly
difficult in situations where a single approach is imple-
mented to achieve multiple objectives: PES schemes are
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frequently also viewed as poverty alleviation and devel-
opment tools (Daw et al. 2011).
Sustainability certification schemes (hereafter certifica-
tion schemes) and eco-labeling (e.g., Rainforest Alliance,
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil) rely on consumer
activism and pressure on companies to improve business
practices and ethics, thereby promoting sustainability in
the global supply chain. Forestry certification schemes
like the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) are among the
most developed schemes (Auld et al. 2008): the amount of
FSC-certified forests has increased to over 186 Mha in the
span of about two decades (FSC 2016), and some stud-
ies have reported improved forest health in FSC-certified
forests (e.g., Kalonga et al. 2015).
Certification schemes, however, have the potential to
create similar effects in terms of a re-organization of sup-
ply and associated consequences for expansion of out-
put as those arising from a quota. For instance, if the
scheme gives certified suppliers exclusive access to the
consumers with a high willingness to pay (q1, Figure 1),
but is not tied to firm efficiency, then less efficient firms
could end up among the suppliers in the certified mar-
ket, displacing efficient firms into the uncertified market.
Indeed, certification usually results in a rise in price of
certified commodities (from p0 to p1, Figure 1B), thereby
restricting access to wealthier consumers. Prices of certi-
fied timber within Malaysia, for instance, were up to 56%
higher than uncertified timber (Kollert & Lagan 2007).
Therefore, only relatively wealthy consumers can afford
certified products, while less wealthy purchasers con-
tinue buying unregulated and uncertified products (q2p2,
Figure 1B). Additionally, if prices of certified-sustainable
goods are too high, the market demand could be lower
than the supply and we could observe lower uptake
than expected (Edwards & Laurance 2012). FSC schemes,
for example, have increased in popularity over the last
decade, but were concentrated in newly developed coun-
tries across the tropics, and usually do not include devel-
oping nations with larger native forests (Auld et al. 2008).
Importantly, because certification schemes do not pe-
nalize the informal market (i.e., no additional costs for
supplying the unregulated market), we can expect the
unregulated market to thrive. While certification schemes
like FSC directly reduce poor logging practices within cer-
tified forests (formal market; from q0 to q1, Figure 1B),
they could also result in leakage of (illegal) logging into
unmanaged forests (from q0 to q2, Figure 1B), making the
overall management of resources and deforestation more
difficult. Indeed, illegal timber products account for 50–
90% of forestry products across the tropics (Nellemann
2012). Similar leakage effects could also emerge from
other certification schemes. RSPO certification might be
effective in promoting sustainable agricultural practices
within certified oil palm plantations, but we could also
witness a leakage effect not only affecting unprotected
forests, but also production of other crops. RSPO certi-
fication across Indonesia led to increased conversion of
existing rice cropland (Koh & Wilcove 2008) and jungle
rubber plantation (Warren-Thomas et al. 2015) into oil
palm plantations, resulting in an indirect displacement of
efforts and habitat conversion in Indochina.
Biodiversity offsets and other trading schemes
Biodiversity trading schemes could be classified as
market-driven measures to reduce biodiversity loss, but
have also been passed as legislations in some countries.
These are typically enforced on companies and develop-
ers to allow for economic growth and development, while
indirectly reducing human pressures on biodiversity and
the environment (Froger et al. 2015). Such schemes have
been legislated in a number of countries (e.g., Australia)
or regions (e.g., California), and widely embraced and
adopted by private land developers and companies, in-
cluding mining and oil companies (Edwards et al. 2014),
as a means of measuring and reducing their impact on
biodiversity loss.
Biodiversity offsets and trading schemes, in essence,
place restrictions on some areas (reserves) while allow-
ing others to be converted for use. Fundamentally, these
methods mimic legally mandated conservation efforts
(e.g., PAs), where the amount of land use is restricted
(Figure 1A). Such offsets can only be effective at a very
local level (i.e., within reserves themselves), and reserves
need to have higher conservation values than areas be-
ing converted to achieve a no-net loss outcome. Enforc-
ing restrictions on land-use, as with other conservation
measures, does not affect the demand for land, timber or
nontimber forest resources, and could result in a displace-
ment of efforts outside the managed (regulated) area.
Where reserves are of high economic value, land pur-
chases in biodiversity offsetting programs could also alter
supply and demand of resources, resulting in increased
land rent and therefore biodiversity loss in unprotected
areas (Armsworth et al. 2006).
Land sparing and high-yielding crop varieties
The land-sparing versus land-sharing framework, which
considers the trade-offs between agricultural or timber
demands and the desire to protect biodiversity, has
been widely applied in the debate of how best to meet
growing resource demands (Phalan et al. 2011). Notwith-
standing the limitations of both strategies (Fischer et al.
2011; Erb et al. 2016), a large number of data-based
assessments suggest that the land-sparing approach of
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high-yield farming with habitat conserved elsewhere, if
managed correctly with strong governance and effective
protection of remaining forests, might be more effective
in promoting biodiversity conservation while meeting
demand (Phalan et al. 2011; Erb et al. 2016). Agricultural
intensification is a necessary condition for land-sparing,
but not a sufficient condition for reducing the need to
convert more forest to farmland (Erb et al. 2016).
Agricultural intensification, however, does not reduce
the incentives associated with expansion; agricultural
area has been observed on occasion to increase with in-
tensification (Ewers et al. 2009; Rudel et al. 2009). Projec-
tions of land-use changes have also suggested the possi-
bility of further loss of forests with improved crop yields
(Kaimowitz & Angelsen 2008; Phelps et al. 2013; Villoria
et al. 2014). This is especially so in passive land-sparing
scenarios, where remaining forests are not managed or
protected effectively, and hence easily targeted for agri-
cultural expansion (Phalan et al. 2016). A rebound ef-
fect known as Jevon’s paradox could arise, where the in-
creased efficiency and reduced costs of crop production
instead lead to increased demands. The magnitude of this
effect could vary, depending on elasticity demand of the
product (Hertel 2011; Villoria et al. 2014). For agricul-
tural intensification to be effective in reducing land-use
change, an active land-sparing framework is necessary,
with heavy reliance on the role of PAs and effective gov-
ernance (Phalan et al. 2016), which many countries might
lack (Fischer et al. 2011).
Increasing agricultural productivity could make crops
cheaper and more profitable to produce over time, and
increase its uses and demand as a cheaper substitute for
other less cost-efficient crops (Villoria et al. 2014), even
at transnational scales (Figure 3). If this results in favor-
ing more cost-efficient tropical crops (e.g., oil palm), this
could then exacerbate agricultural expansion across the
tropics (Carrasco et al. 2014). There could be an increase
in land abandonment and reforestation within low-profit
areas, i.e., a decrease in land use from q0 to qB (Figure 3),
but this is coupled with increased expansion and defor-
estation (q0 to qA, Figure 3) within areas of higher mar-
ket value. The benefits of increased forest regeneration in
marginal areas for agriculture across the Neotropics (e.g.,
highlands), for instance, would be outweighed by the
negative impacts on biodiversity from increased defor-
estation in the lowland tropical forest (Aide et al. 2013).
Managing the effects of market
outcomes
Assessing perverse outcomes in studies
Conservation interventions need to work toward incor-
porating steps to monitor and minimize perverse out-
comes (Larrosa et al. 2016), but little has been done
to overcome these outcomes. Some studies have, how-
ever, looked into incorporating and evaluating unin-
tended feedbacks into their analyses of PAs and incor-
porated spatial information, theoretical models, and bio-
diversity maps to project spatially explicit predictions
of areas more vulnerable to leakage (Bode et al. 2015;
Renwick et al. 2015). Others have identified and mea-
sured leakage of conservation policies such as REDD+,
using econometric or general equilibrium models (e.g.,
Murray et al. 2004; Gan and McCarl 2007). These models
center on identifying the market feedbacks incurred from
the conservation action, and understanding how they
translate into indirect impacts on resources, i.e., through
the unregulated market.
A number of factors also need to be considered when
assessing, predicting, and managing these perverse out-
comes. Since costs associated with land-use change vary
across space due to multiple factors (social, political, and
environmental), we would also expect the magnitude of
market outcomes and impacts on biodiversity to vary be-
tween regions (Armsworth et al. 2006; Chaplin-Kramer
et al. 2015) and across different spatial scales. While some
studies acknowledge this, few have incorporated spatial
information in their models (e.g., Bode et al. 2015). Not
accounting for spatial variation results in often-erroneous
assumptions of homogeneity across landscapes.
As with spatial scales, actions tend to be implemented
across short timescales, but the effects of land conver-
sion and land use are long term: time lags in responses
and impacts on habitat and biodiversity (e.g., extinction
debts and forest regeneration) might not be captured in
static analyses (Ghazoul et al. 2015). Displacement costs
of policies and actions could at times be intergenera-
tional (Roca 2003), and while the immediate effects of
some measures might seem positive, by not making as-
sessments over longer temporal scales we do not con-
sider other socio-economic factors and market feedbacks
that might be detrimental (Hill et al. 2015). The bene-
fits of PES schemes and other long-term measures are
also often based on the assumption that other conditions
in the market are constant, but land-use regimes could
be implemented alongside other regulations and socio-
economic changes and shocks (Müller et al. 2014), which
will impact on the effectiveness of the regime. More em-
phasis needs to be placed on dynamic effects in planning
long-term measures.
Another aspect of market-based outcomes often not
addressed in studies is the interaction between distant
parts of the world (teleconnectedness; Carrasco et al.
2014). Given the importance of global markets and
transnational trade, overlooking the effects of telecon-
nectedness could lead to a considerable underestimation
of the indirect impacts on land-use change (Renwick et al.
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2015): since legislations, policies, and other conserva-
tion measures are usually localized, studies tend to fo-
cus only on local and national effects. The consequences
of these conservation policies and actions are, however,
usually spread across much larger spatial scales and be-
tween countries and continents (Liu et al. 2013). Reduc-
ing land-use in one area, without a reduction in resource
demand, could lead to agricultural expansion and land
conversion in another, and countries with large gains in
forest cover might observe increases in imports of wood
and agricultural products (Gan & McCarl 2007; Meyfroidt
et al. 2013). For instance, regulations to increase forest re-
generation within Vietnam (Meyfroidt & Lambin 2009)
and China (Viña et al. 2016) led to an increased import of
timber products. Projections of land-use changes should
also account for the possible influence of alternative and
complementary markets. Oil palm, for instance, can be a
cheaper substitute to other oil-producing crops, includ-
ing soy and rapeseed, and changes in prices and quanti-
ties of one crop could affect demands of each substitute
crop (Figure 3), and ultimately increase land-use across
the tropics (Carrasco et al. 2014).
Reducing the risk of perverse incentives within
formal markets
Our framework also helps highlight how policies might
be designed to help mitigate these unwanted effects. Con-
servation policies should recognize where conditions and
incentives exist for officials to be corrupt regarding the
selection of suppliers and make this a focal point for anti-
corruption investigation. Policies also need to implement
mechanisms to increase transparency and address infor-
mation asymmetries by employing competitive tendering
mechanisms allowing the efficient firms to reveal them-
selves (Smith & Walpole 2005). Third-party auditing, for
instance, may be a potentially effective means of increas-
ing transparency and minimizing probability of leakage
and of perverse behavior within the formal market (Cook
et al. 2016). Measures like these would limit the poten-
tial for corruption to dictate the exploitation of land and
resources.
Reducing the risk of informal markets emerging
Our framework also points at the emergence of an
informal market as an important source of perverse
outcomes from conservation efforts (Figure 1B). Con-
servation policies therefore need to be more inclusive
of the entire market to identify and manage leakage
effects; the quota-policy framework only pays attention
to the formal market. Conservation policies that, for
instance, incorporate and account for trade and import of
agricultural and forestry products represent a step toward
being more inclusive and could potentially minimize the
likelihood and scale of leakage. Effective spatial planning
and targeting specific areas to intensify agriculture,
while ensuring designated areas are kept protected for
conservation, is another way to minimize leakage effects
(Phalan et al. 2016).
Managing conservation efforts should also focus on
minimizing the risks of informal markets emerging. This
involves a thorough understanding and projection of
price and market condition changes in response to the
initial conservation measure, as well as a working knowl-
edge of the various actors in the formal and informal mar-
kets. Monitoring changes in prices of resources and un-
derstanding how they relate to emerging illegal markets
is one way to better pre-empt and manage unintended
feedbacks. Efforts toward better detection and punish-
ment of illegal market operations will increase the costs
of these trades and this will reduce the viability of sup-
pliers in this market reducing the extent of the leakage
(a downward shift in the supply curve in the unregulated
sector in Figure 1B).
It is also important that we identify and monitor the
key actors most likely to supply the informal market, and
potential leakage sinks. This should allow for the more
efficient detection of unintended and deleterious changes
in land use. Measures to detect leakage should also focus
on flows of unregulated or illegal products: trade flows
may be used as a means of identifying transnational
leakage and displacement of deforestation practices in
response to conservation efforts (Meyfroidt & Lambin
2011). Achieving this can be challenging: illegal timber,
for instance, is often laundered through legal plantations
and mills (Nellemann 2012). Using satellite imagery
could be another way of monitoring areas more likely
to be cleared, and minimizing displacement and leakage
effects. Empirical studies suggest, for instance, that buffer
zones and forested areas surrounding PAs are more
prone to being cleared (Pfeifer et al. 2012), and focusing
monitoring efforts in such areas could lower the chances
of forest loss. Spatially explicit econometric analyses
might also be effective in identifying key areas likely
to undergo land conversion. Importantly, monitoring
and management should not be restricted within na-
tional boundaries, but should also include transnational
leakage.
Conclusion
Most conservation measures tend to focus only on the
primary and direct outcomes on nature and biodiversity,
while indirect consequences are overlooked. This could
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lead to an overestimation of the true effects of the
intervention, and the promotion of conservation actions
that yield minimal to no overall conservation benefit:
rather than reducing biodiversity loss, they could instead
be counterproductive. Applying economic principles, we
highlight the possible perverse consequences that are
often not accounted for. This allows us to acknowledge
these counterproductive impacts and, ideally, to seek
ways to mitigate these effects through further regula-
tions or extending the spatial extent of action, working
toward optimal management strategies. Appreciating, if
not understanding, the vulnerability and sensitivity of
biodiversity conservation efforts to market feedbacks is
a first step toward designing and managing conservation
interventions more effectively.
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